draft-ietf-moq-secure-objects-01 | published 2026-07-06 | Datatracker draft-ietf-moq-secure-objects-00 | 23 pages
Authors
- Cullen Jennings (Cisco)
- suhas-nandakumar (Cisco)
- Richard Barnes (Cisco)
Abstract
Defines an authenticated encryption scheme for objects transmitted via moq-transport. Publishers sharing symmetric keys with end subscribers can prevent relays from decrypting content. Subscribers can verify object integrity and authenticity.
Key Properties
- E2E encryption: Relays cannot read object content
- Integrity verification: Subscribers verify objects came from the claimed publisher
- Publisher control: Publishers decide whether relays can access or modify MOQT parameters
- Symmetric keys: Key distribution is out of scope but key sharing between publisher and subscriber is required
Replaces
This draft (draft-ietf-moq-secure-objects-00) replaces the individual draft draft-jennings-moq-secure-objects, now adopted as a WG document.
Recent Highlights
Day-by-day WG/PR activity lives in the wiki log; this section keeps only durable milestones.
- Path to WGLC (IETF-126 Monday session, 2026-07-20; minutes posted 2026-07-22): the WG agreed to advance secure-objects toward Working Group Last Call. Cullen Jennings proposed moving the draft to WGLC and parking it until the core transport registry stabilizes (the shared IANA registries transport-19 establishes must settle first); Suhas Nandakumar supported. So secure-objects is queued as one of the first WG documents to reach Last Call once transport’s IANA Considerations are closed out — but it is explicitly gated on the transport registry, not independent. WG consensus is to not provide end-to-end security for track properties. Track-level data flowing over MOQT control messages is not protected E2E; apps needing E2E signaling add those properties to the first object of a group. This is the most consequential structural decision.
- AAD structural change: the AAD now authenticates only the serialized immutable properties — Track Namespace and Track Name were removed from the AAD structure, aligning with the Issue #74 option-#1 decision.
- Fixed-width integers for AAD and nonce: switched from varints to fixed-width integers to remove canonicalization ambiguity in AEAD inputs. Object ID is finalized at 32 bits, so publishers must rotate keys before exhausting the 32-bit Object-ID space within a key generation.
- Publisher priority brought under AEAD authentication so relays cannot manipulate it; a padding property was added for byte-boundary alignment.
- Threat model documented, including fan-out attacks.
- Test-vectors appendix +
-01published (2026-07-06) — worked AEAD test vectors so implementations can verify encryption/authentication against canonical inputs (interop-readiness); the long-flagged first revision since -00 carries this appendix into published text.
Related
- moq-transport - Transport layer that carries secure objects
- moq-privacy-pass - Complementary authentication mechanism
- moq-loc - Container format that integrates with secure objects